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INTERPRETING THE POLLUTION
EXCLUSION CLAUSE IN THE COMPREHENSIVE
GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY - OHIO'S NEXT STEP
by
W. ROGER FRY*
JONATHAN P. SAXTON"
INTRODUCTION
The 1970's and 1980's have been witness to the discovery and identification
of countless hazardous waste sites throughout Ohio and elsewhere. Disputes over
responsibility are pending in virtually all our courts.' Before the first sites were
remediated other battles began - the inevitable claims related to insurance coverage.
Courts across the country have been called upon to resolve the disputes. Some well
reasoned decisions have been written; however, others have only added confusion
and inconsistency in attempting to address the varied issues of insurance coverage
for environmental claims. There is a growing realization that we have only seen the
proverbial tip of the iceberg. The number of hazardous waste sites which require
immediate attention is increasing markedly2 and costs are escalating at an uncon-
trolled rate.
The issue of insurance coverage for environmental claims is one of the most
significant and controversial issues with which our courts will be faced in the 1990's.
The average remediation cost of a site is nearly $9 million.3 This figure may quad-
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Liability for the operation of or connection with a hazardous waste site can be grounded in statute or the
common law of torts. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) imposes strict liability for the past handling, transportation, storage, treatment and disposal of
hazardous waste upon the site owners and operators, and on the waste generators and transporters. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Liability may also be based upon other statutes, such as the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)), the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)), and the Safe Drinking Water Act (42
U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). Additionally, legal responsibility may take the form of
common law tort claims of nuisance, negligence, trespass or strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities.
2 As of March, 1989 the Superfund National Priority List (NPL) contained 849 sites. By comparison, in 1983
the NPL contained 406 sites. Twenty-seven Ohio sites were listed in the 1989 NPL. The NPL, according
to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), serves primarily informational purposes, identifying for the
states and the public those facilities and sites or other releases which appear to warrant remedial action.
National Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites, 52 Fed. Reg. 27,621 (1987).
3 According to the EPA, the cost of a site in 1986 dollars, is as follows:
Remedial investigation/feasibility study $875,000.00
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ruple, or more, under the 1986 amendments to Superfund.4 Larger sites have been
estimated in the hundreds of millions. Nonetheless, sites will be remediated and
response and litigation costs will be paid. Insurers and potentially responsible par-
ties need to know at the earliest possible time whether or not insurance coverage will
exist. Our courts must address and resolve these insurance coverage issues correctly,
and with finality.
While there are numerous intriguing insurance coverage issues in the environ-
mental claims area,5 the focus of this article will be on the much litigated issue of the
"pollution exclusion" clause. This clause became integrated into the standard form
Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policy in 1973.6 The standard clause was
included in most, though not all, insurance policies from 1973' through 1986. The
clause excludes coverage for pollution unless it is sudden and accidental. It provides:
It is agreed that the insurance does not apply to bodily injury or property
damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or
gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into
or upon land, the atmosphere, or any watercourse or body of water; but
this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or
escape is sudden and accidental.
This clause has been the subject of litigation in both state and federal courts,
and has probably received more inconsistent treatment than any other clause in a
policy.8 Most courts which have addressed this subject recently have acknowledged
that the pollution exclusion clause does exclude coverage for pollution related
Remedial design $850,000.00
Remedial action $8,600,000.00
Id. at 27,632. Litigation costs have historically been approximately 55% of the total clean-up costs.
Insurance Issues and Superfund: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1985) (testimony of John C. Butler, III); Murphy & Caron, Insurance Coverage and
Environmental Liability, 38 FICC Q. 353, 358 (1988).
4 The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) has imposed stricter clean-up
standards. Consequently, costs have escalated. EPA estimates place cleanup costs between $30 million and
$50 million per site. 17 Env't Rep. 779 (1986).
1 Some of the most litigated issues include whether pollution constitutes an occurrence, the trigger of
coverage, the owned property exclusion, and whether cleanup costs are equitable or legal damages.
6 Proposed by the Insurance Rating Board (IRB) in 1970, the clause was added to the comprehensive general
liability (CGL) standard form policy in 1973. The IRB form exclusion was developed, partly, in response
to decisions adverse to insurers, such as Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 32 Ohio App. 2d
178, 289 N.E.2d 360 (1972) (coverage for intentional emission of air pollutants over seven year period
because the damage was completely unexpected and unintended). Soderstrom, The Role of Insurance in
Environmental Litigation, 11 FORUM 762, 766-68 (1976).
1 Chesler, Rodburg & Smith, Patterns of Judicial Interpretation of Insurance Coveragefor Hazardous Waste
Site Liability, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 9, 16 (1986).
8 Murphy & Caron, supra note 3, at 369. The situation in Ohio, where the state and federal courts have taken
conflicting positions, is but one example.
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claims, but for the "sudden and accidental" exception to the exclusion. Simply
stated, if the release of the pollution was "sudden and accidental" the policy would
provide coverage. If it was not, there would be no coverage. Accordingly, cover-
age in any given case depends upon not only a factual finding, but the judicial
interpretation of "sudden and accidental."
The particular philosophies related to insurance held by the members of the
judiciary who have decided these cases are, all too often, mirrored in their decisions.
Result-oriented courts which have sought to impose coverage have found ambigui-
ties with "sudden and accidental. 9 Other courts have attempted to apply the plain
meaning of the words "sudden and accidental," as used in the policy, which would
preclude coverage for any non "sudden and accidental" pollution such as gradual,
expected or intended pollution.' 0 This kind of inconsistency in the law mandates
rational resolution. We believe the proper resolution lies in the latter analysis of the
insurance policy.
To date, two Ohio appellate courts have reached the conclusion that the pol-
lution exclusion is ambiguous." A federal court, 2 applying Ohio law, has reached
a contrary conclusion. The Ohio Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this issue. As
a consequence the law in Ohio is unsettled.
Our purpose here is to analyze the courts' treatment of the pollution exclusion
clause. From the context of insurance policy interpretation, decisions regarding the
exclusion will be reviewed and placed in a national perspective. The Ohio decisions
will be examined against the backdrop of current trends and the national consensus.
We conclude, for the reasons which follow, that the Ohio Supreme Court,
when presented with the issue, should not adopt the findings of the Ohio appellate
courts in interpreting the pollution exclusion clause, but should recognize that those
decisions were wrong and follow the law which finds sudden and accidental not
ambiguous. That is, the standard pollution exclusion clause is not ambiguous as
drafted and the wording "sudden and accidental" should be accorded its literal and
common meaning. These insurance coverage disputes should not be determined on
the basis of the judicial canons of construction for insurance policies but on factual
determinations in relation to these policies.
9 New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1987) (case involving
duty to defend and indemnify in connection with liability from pollution leaching from landfill; "sudden"
within pollution exclusion clause held ambiguous; coverage existed).
10 Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v, Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986) (nearly
identical facts; pollution exclusion clause held unambiguous: It strains logic to perceive ambiguity; no
coverage).
I Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chemicals Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227
(1984); Kipin Indus. v. American Universal Ins. Co., 41 Ohio App. 3d 228, 535 N.E.2d 334 (1987). These
decisions are discussed, in detail, infra.
12 Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated F.M. Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Ohio 1987), affd, 865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 68 (1989). This decision is discussed, in detail, infra.
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HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSE
The pollution exclusion clause is best understood in the context of the devel-
opment of the standard insurance policy. It is axiomatic that the primary purpose of
CGL insurance is to protect insureds against liability for third party damages which
they are legally obligated to pay. 13 Standardized liability insurance polices were first
developed during the 1930's. The policies covered risks that were "caused by
accident." 14 In the mid-1940's this language was broadened to include gradual
happenings and the term "occurrence" replaced accident.15 The policies defined
"occurrence" as "an accident including [injurious] exposure to conditions, which
results [during the policy period] in bodily injury or property damage neither ex-
pected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."' 16 Generally, this language
was broad enough to fit most pollution claims.
In the late 1960's and the early 1970's, the attention of the nation began to
focus on environmental matters within our own land. A new awareness of our
environment made it evident that past and present policies related to the use of toxic
chemicals, waste generation and waste disposal were inadequate and that conditions
were being created which had the potential of causing very serious harm.' 7 These
concerns became reality in later years as evidenced by, for example, Love Canal,
Times Beach, and other sites and incidents across the country.' 8
It became clear to the insurance industry in the early years of pollution and
environmental concern that the scope of the risk could not be computed and the costs
of correcting conditions could not be calculated. Insurance underwriters, in
analyzing the role which insurance would play in the future, realized that environ-
mental claims of immeasurable magnitude would be presented against industry for
ongoing practices which would take decades to change.
" See Gray v. State, 191 So. 2d 802 (La. Ct. App. 1966), afftd, 250 La. 1054, 202 So. 2d 24 (1967); Kissel
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 380 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Note, The Applicability of General
Liability Insurance to Hazardous Waste Disposal, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 757 (1984).
"4 Bean, The Accident Versus the Occurrence Concept, 1959 INs. L.J. 550. The phrase "caused by accident"
was carefully selected to link coverage to an identifiable sudden event and eliminate coverage for intentional
damage. Id. at 551.
5 Some policies of the 1940's, referred to as comprehensive personal liability policies (CPL), were drafted
without the accident limitation. These policies contained an intentional acts exclusion to retain the
"inadvertancy aspect" of the accident phraseology. Bean, supra note 14, at 552.
6 Comment, The Pollution Exclusion in the Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy, 1986 ILL.
L. REV. 897, 904.
17 Chapter one of F.P. Grad's TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW presents an enlightening review of the
beginnings of modem environmental law. Rachel Carson's book "Silent Spring," which was published in
1962, brought home to many the environmental issues of the day.
"I The Love Canal site, covered extensively by the media, involved the disposal of 22,000 tons of chemicals
under a school yard. Times Beach involved 150,000 tons of earth contaminated with Dioxin at a riverside
site in Missouri. Some of the earlier environmental incidents included the 1967 Torrey Canyon Oil Tanker
incident off the coast of England, the 1968 Ocean Eagle Tanker incident off the coast of Puerto Rico and the
1969 offshore oil drilling operation explosion near California. The possible toxic effects of DDT, as
chronicled by Carson, also attracted media and popular attention.
[Vol. 23:3AKRON LAW REVIEW
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Predicting (correctly) the barrage of claims for damages from pollution, insur-
ance carriers added a special exclusion in 1973 - the pollution exclusion clause. The
purpose of this exclusion was to prohibit companies from following a course of
action of polluting and then falling back on their insurance companies for restitution.
Pollution clearly constituted an occurrence as defined within the policy as long as it
was not expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured. 9 The pollution
exclusion of 1973, however, states unqualifiedly that there would be no coverage for
pollution unless the pollution was "sudden and accidental." Although the drafters
of this language may have thought that "sudden and accidental" had a clear
meaning, the interpretations which this language has received by some courts has
demonstrated the issue that exists. As the policies did not define the exception to the
exclusion, interpretation was left to the courts.
RULES OF INSURANCE POLICY INTERPRETATION
Before the varied interpretations by the courts are addressed, a brief review of
the principles of judicial construction of insurance policies might be helpful. 20 Since
the relationship between the insured and the insurer is a contractual one, the rules
governing construction and interpretation of contracts generally apply in construing
insurance policies. As a consequence, ambiguities in the policies will be construed
against the drafters, the insurers. The first question asked is whether the contract
needs to be interpreted. The Ohio Supreme Court has stated, "when words used in
a policy of insurance have a plain and ordinary meaning, it is neither necessary nor
permissible to resort to construction unless the plain meaning would lead to an
absurd result.' '21
It is important to note that the determination of ambiguity is merely a threshold
leading to the true issue of ascertaining the policy's meaning. It is over this threshold
that result-oriented courts have stepped. In other words, a holding in favor of the
insured can be easily justified if (or when) the insurance policy is found to be am-
biguous.
Whether the policy language is ambiguous can itself be an issue. It is a
question of fact, and such a conclusion requires a factual finding of ambiguity.
Merely questioning the ambiguity of a policy does not in itself create an ambiguity.
19 It is imperative to note a finding that the pollution at issue falls within the definition of occurrence does
not resolve all the insurance coverage issues. Of paramount importance is. whether the liability incurred
constitutes compensable damages under the insurance policy. See Pendygraft, Plews, Clark & Wright, Who
Pays for Environmental Damage: Recent Developments in CERCLA Liability and Insurance Coverage
Litigation, 21 IND. L.R. 117 (1988); CGL CoverageforHazardous Substances Clean-Up, FOR THE DEF., Mar.
1988, at 21. Even the applicability of an exclusion does not remove this coverage issue.
20 For the purposes of this article, Ohio law will be discussed. Nevertheless, the general principles are
virtually standard in all jurisdictions.
21 Blohm v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 39 Ohio St. 3d 63,529 N.E.2d 433 (1988) (underinsured motorist coverage
at issue); see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Reddick, 37 Ohio St. 2d 119, 308 N.E.2d 454 (1974); Olmstead
v. Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co.. 22 Ohio St. 2d 212, 259 N.E.2d 123 (1970).
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It would indeed be absurd reasoning if asking the question supplied the answer.
Nonetheless, insured in cases have proposed no less in arguments to the courts, and
prevailed.
The principles of judicial construction do favor the insured, but they are by no
means a guarantee of success for the insured. The goal is to obtain a reasonable
construction of the contract in conformity with the intentions of the parties as
gathered from the ordinary and commonly understood meaning of the language
employed.22
It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation and construction of insurance policies
that any ambiguous term or provision be construed liberally in favor of the insured
and strictly against the insurer. 23 According to the Ohio Court of Appeals for Summit
County, any reasonable construction which results in coverage must be adopted by
the trial court. Uncertain contract language must be strictly construed against the
insurer. 24 Nevertheless, common words appearing in the policy are to be given their
ordinary meaning unless a manifest absurdity results, or unless some other meaning
is clearly evidenced from the face or overall content of the instrument.25
OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE LAW
Two discernible lines of case law interpreting the pollution exclusion clause
exist throughout the country. The older, and at one point predominant, view holds
that the clause is marked by ambiguity. This ambiguity in an insurance contract
resulted, and invariably results, in a finding of coverage for the insured. This line
of case law originated in New Jersey and, for our purposes, will be referred to as the
New Jersey approach. The early New Jersey cases significantly impacted the then
emerging area of law dealing with insurance coverage for environmental harms.
Subsequent to the first New Jersey case on point, courts in other jurisdictions
began to employ a different analysis. These courts rejected the insureds' arguments
that the clause was ambiguous, and addressed the factual issues of whether the
pollution was "sudden and accidental." This line of case law actually developed
simultaneously in several jurisdictions but for the purpose of this article, will be
referred to as the North Carolina approach since North Carolina presented a strong
early view on this issue. Today, the North Carolina approach, holding that the
pollution exclusion clause is unambiguous, represents the growing national trend.
22 King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St. 3d 208,211,519 N.E.2d 1380, 1383 (1988) (declaratory judgment
action to determine insureds); see also Dealers Dairy Products Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 170 Ohio St. 336, 164
N.E.2d 745 (1960); Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Wright, 17 Ohio St. 2d 73, 246 N.E.2d 552 (1969).
23 Sterling Merchandise Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 30 Ohio App. 3d 131, 137, 506 N.E.2d 1192, 1198 (1986)
(dispute involving "safe burglary" insurance coverage).
24 Blohm, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 66, 529 N.E.2d at 436.
25 Id
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Ohio does not clearly follow either of the approaches. Our Supreme Court has
not addressed the issue. A split exists between the Ohio appellate courts and the Sixth
Circuit's application of Ohio law. The Ohio appellate courts in Buckeye Union2 6 and
Kipin27 concluded the clause was ambiguous; the Sixth Circuit in Borden concluded
it was not and that the Ohio Supreme Court, when faced with the issue, would not
adopt the reasoning of the appellate courts.28 The following chronological review
of the case law across the country demonstrates that the latter view represents the
better reasoned view.29
THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW
Foundations.: A Trilogy Of Important Cases Impacting Ohio Law.
In 1973 insurance companies began, almost uniformly, to issue CGL policies
containing the pollution exclusion clause. In late 1974, 14,000 gallons of asphalt oil
leaked from storage tanks on the property of Lansco, Inc. in Bogota, New Jersey. 30
By 1975, Lansco and its insurance carriers were before the New Jersey courts t
arguing the effect of a provision that before had caused little controversy. The result
was New Jersey's and apparently the nation's first judicial decision interpreting the
pollution exclusion clause.
Setting the standard for subsequent, and even some modem cases, the Lansco
court set forth its interpretation of "sudden and accidental." ,3 2 The court noted that
there was no specific definition in the policy of the terms "sudden and accidental.' 33
In such a case, the words must be interpreted, according to the court, in accordance
with their plain, ordinary and commonly understood meaning. 34 Citing Webster's
New International Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary, the court determined that
"sudden" meant happening without previous notice or on very brief notice;
unprepared for, unforeseen; or unexpected.35 "Accidental" was defined as happen-
26 Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chemicals Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227.
27 Kipin Indus. v. American Universal Ins. Co., 41 Ohio App. 3d 228, 535 N.E.2d 334.
28 Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated F.M. Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 927.
29 This review is limited to the most pertinent cases on point as they apply to the issue of the pollution
exclusion clause.
30 Lansco, Inc. v. Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 278, 350 A.2d 520,521 (1975), aff d, 145
N.J. Super. 433,368 A.2d 363 (1976), cert. denied, 73 N.J. 57,372 A.2d 322 (1977) (apparently vandals had
opened the valves on the large storage tanks).
3' Lansco contracted with a company for the cleanup of the oil spill. Id. at 280, 350 A.2d at 523. Lansco's
insurance carrier declined coverage for the damages as a result of the oil spill on the grounds that, inter alia,
the occurrence was neither sudden nor accidental within the exclusion clause. Lansco then filed suit against
its carrier seeking a declaratory judgment that coverage did exist. The policy at issue contained the standard
pollution exclusion clause. The court held coverage existed.
32 id. The Lansco court's definitional finding has been a consistent strand found in cases following the New
Jersey approach up to the present day. Courts following the North Carolina approach nonetheless
Zonsistently refute this finding.
33 Id. at 281-82, 350 A.2d at 523.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 282, 350 A.2d at 524.
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ing unexpectedly or by chance; taking place not according to usual course.36
Whether an occurrence was accidental was to be determined from the standpoint of
the insured.37 The oil spill was neither expected nor intended by Lansco; thus, the
spill was sudden and accidental under the exclusion clause even if caused by the
deliberate act of a third party.38 The exclusion clause was found to be inapplicable,
and the carrier was held to owe coverage. 39
Lansco was the first of three important cases that had a major impact on the
development of Ohio law regarding the pollution exclusion clause issue. In fact,
these cases form the foundation of the New Jersey approach. It will be shown that
recent cases have, metaphorically, shaken this foundation. Nonetheless, the Lansco
court's initial definition of "sudden" and "accidental" directly influenced the
development of Ohio law. No other court offered a definition of "sudden" or of
"accidental" until 1980.40
The next important case, and the second in the trilogy, came from New York.
The court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Klock Oil Co.,4t interpreting the pollution
exclusion clause, held that the insurer had a duty to defend in an action for damages
sustained when the insured's underground gasoline storage tank leaked.42 This case
is significant for its dramatically broad definition of "sudden." According to the
court, "the word 'sudden' as used in liability insurance need not be limited to an in-
stantaneous happening. ' 43 In other words, even a gradual happening could be
"sudden." The exclusion clause then could not operate to preclude coverage for
pollution occurring over a period of time. This is precisely the consequence the
insurance companies apparently hoped to avoid by including the pollution exclusion
in their occurrence-based policies. "Sudden" was no longer defined as it is by a
standard dictionary, or given its ordinary meaning. In order to assure coverage the
definition was expanded to include pollution over a period of time. Klock Oil
became an oft cited case by insureds and courts following the New Jersey approach.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 /d.
39 Id.
40 In the interim, several courts addressed the issue of the pollution exclusion clause. In Molton, Allen &
Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95 (Ala. 1977) the Alabama Supreme Court found
that the pollution exclusion clause was ambiguous. The clause was interpreted such that it would cover only
industrial pollution and contamination. The pollution in the case, sand and water runoff from construction,
did not invoke the exclusion to coverage.
In Niagara County v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 103 Misc. 2d 814, 427 N.Y.S.2d 171 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980), aff d, 80 A.D.2d 415,439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), a New York trial court found that the
insurance carrier did owe a duty to defend Niagara County against allegations that chemical waste dumping
took place within the county with its acquiesence. Much of the opinion was devoted to the public policy
ramifications if the county were to be deprived of coverage for those claims.
41 73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
42 Id.
41 Id. at 488, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
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Klock Oil notwithstanding, that regular and frequent discharges of gas were
not sudden or accidental was clear without discussion to an Indiana appellate court
in Barmet of Indiana, Inc. v. Security Insurance Group.' The "regular" malfunc-
tion of a pollution control system on a once or twice-a-week basis was not sudden
and accidental.45 Hence, the insurer did not owe coverage.
Citing for support Lansco and Klock, and distinguishing Barmet, New Jersey
wrote the final chapter of the trilogy affecting Ohio law. In Jackson Township
Municipal Utilities Authority v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 46 the court
expanded Lansco, and, effectively, wrote the pollution exclusion clause out of the
CGL policy. Under Jackson Township, pollution can be sudden and accidental if
either the discharge was unexpected or if the result was unexpected or unintended.
There would be no coverage for the intended results of intentional acts but coverage
would exist for "unintended results of an intentional act." ,47 According to the court,
"the clause can be interpreted as simply a restatement of the definition of 'occur-
rence'." 41 In other words, the CGL was back to its early 1970's position. Jackson
Township, like Klock Oil's interpretation of'" sudden", exposed insurers topotential
liability situations which the exclusion clause was designed to eliminate.4 9 Detri-
mental to insurers and insureds alike, however, was the uncertainty cast into the law.
The Ohio Decisions and Other Important Contemporaneous Decisions
With the early cases - Lansco, Klock Oil, and Jackson Township - in place,
"425 N.E.2d 201,203 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). This case contained an atypical fact scenario in which the insurer
initiated a declaratory judgment action to determine coverage for a wrongful death claim. The decedent had
died in an automobile accident apparently caused by obstruction of its vision by gas emissions from insured's
aluminum recycling plant. These emissions constituted the pollution at issue.
45 Id.
46 186 N.J. Super. 156, 162-64, 451 A.2d 990,993-94 (1982) (citing Molten, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St.
Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95 (clause exempts only industrial pollution); Farm Family Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Bagley, 64 A.D.2d 1014,409 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1978) (exclusion clause inapplicable where insured
was crop spraying); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co. 73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603; Niagara County
v. Uttica Mutual Ins. Co., 103 Misc. 2d 814, 427 N.Y.S.2d 171 (clause exempts only active polluters).
47 Jackson Township, 186 N.J. Super. at 164, 451 A.2d at 994.
41 This finding was cited and followed in several cases including United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake
Union Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708,664 P.2d 1262 (1983). This court held the exclusion clause did not apply
where gasoline had leaked for several months from a hole in an underground line. Neither the leak nor the
resulting damage was expected or intended. This, according to the court, brought the situation into the
exception to the exclusion. In contrast, see National Standard Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., No. CA-3-
81-1015-D, (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 1983) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file) (chemical discharges occurring over
a period of years not sudden and accidental) and Milwaukee v. Allied Smelting Corp., 117 Wis. 2d 377, 344
N.W.2d 523 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (discharge of acid into sewers over a period of two to ten years not sudden
or accident).
49 See Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 335 Pa. Super. 1,487 A.2d 820 (1984) (no coverage where discharge
of chemical TCE occurred on a regular or sporadic basis over 25 years; Great Lakes Container Corp. v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1984) (no coverage for intentional ground contamination
at drum reconditioning plant). Of course, cases following the New Jersey approach all hinge on the initial
determination that the clause is ambiguous, requiring judicial interpretation. Ifa court finds the clause is not
ambiguous then it is to apply the literal meaning of the language without any construction favoring the insurer
or the insured.
POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSESpring, 1990]
9
Fry and Saxton: Pollution Exclusion Clause
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1990
Ohio handed down its first judicial interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause.
Ohio first interpreted the clause in Buckeye Union Insurance Co. v. Liberty Solvents
and Chemicals Co.50 The case was heard by the court on appeal of an award of
summary judgment in favor of Buckeye Union Insurance Company ("Buckeye").
In 1982, the State of Ohio sued Liberty Solvents and Chemicals Co. ("Liberty
Solvents") and 37 other entities in federal court, seeking damages and injunctive and
declaratory relief in connection with a hazardous waste site operated by Chem-Dyne
in Hamilton, Ohio.5 The State of Ohio alleged that Liberty Solvents was liable as
a generator which had contracted with Chem-Dyne for the disposal of hazardous
waste.5 2 The waste was spilled, leaked, and released when drums were dropped and
ruptured or punctured by Chem-Dyne.53 The resulting pollution affected surface
waters, soil, and groundwater around the disposal site.54 The United States filed a
similar complaint. The lawsuits were subsequently consolidated for trial.
Liberty Solvents placed its carrier, Buckeye Union, on notice. Buckeye Union
responded by filing a declaratory judgment action in state court. Liberty Solvents
filed a counter-claim. Cross-motions for summary judgment were then filed; Liberty
Solvents seeking a declaration that Buckeye Union had a duty to defend, and
Buckeye Union seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify
Liberty Solvents. The trial court granted Buckeye Union's motion.5 Liberty
Solvents subsequently appealed to the state appellate court. The appellate court was
presented with the issue of whether the allegations of the complaint stated a claim
for which coverage is or may be afforded by the policy of the insured. The appellate
court held that there was a possible claim for coverage and reversed the trial court
decision.56
The court first noted that CERCLA imposes liability on Liberty Solvents
which would give rise to a duty to defend unless there was "a provision in the policy
which clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage." 57 The court turned to the
pollution exclusion clause which it termed the "polluters exclusion clause.' 58 The
court conceded that the construction of the clause was a question of first impression
in Ohio. However, it noted that the overwhelming authority from other jurisdictions
indicated that the trial court had erred in saying the pollution could not have been
sudden and accidental.5 9 The court grounded its decision on three points.
50 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227.
11 Id. at 127-128, 477 N.E.2d at 1229.
52 Id. at 128, 477 N.E.2d at 1229.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 128, 477 N.E.2d at 1230.
56 Id. at 135-36, 477 N.E.2d at 1237.
17 Id. at 130, 477 N.E.2d at 1232.
58 Id. at 132, 477 N.E.2d at 1234.
59 Id.
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First, the phrase "sudden and accidental" was not defined in the policy.6'
This, on its face, indicated ambiguity. The court relied on Lansco for support.61
UnderLansco, "sudden" was defined as happening on brief notice or that which was
unexpected. 62 "Accidental" was defined as an event happening unexpectedly or by
chance.63 This was to be determined from the viewpoint of the insured because that
would be consistent with the concept of an occurrence. 6
Second, the pollution exclusion clause was said to be a restatement of the
definition of "occurrence." 6s The policy would cover claims when the injury was
neither expected nor intended. 66 That is, there would be no coverage for the intended
results of intentional acts, but there would be coverage for unintended results of
intentional acts.67 This view was derived entirely from Jackson Township.68 The
court also cited Lansco for support.6
9
Third, the court quoted Allstate for the proposition that sudden need not be
limited to an instantaneous happening.7" The court concluded that so long as the
resulting damage was unintended by the insured, then the total situation could be
considered an accident.7' Because there were no allegations in the complaint that
Liberty Solvents intended or expected the releases of hazardous wastes or the dam-
ages, then both could be found sudden and accidental from the standpoint of Liberty
Solvents.
The Buckeye Union court observed that the "overwhelming authority" from
other jurisdictions directed its decision." While the New Jersey approach was the
most popular at the time Buckeye Union was decided, it was not universally adopted.
For example, some courts prior to and shortly after Buckeye Union had found the
clause not to be ambiguous at all.73
In 1986, two years after Buckeye Union, the North Carolina Supreme Court
6 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
63 Id. at 133.
66Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. The court also cited with approval: Niagara County v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 103 Misc. 2d 814, 427
N.Y.S.2d 171; United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708, 664 P.2d 1262;
Traveler's Indemnity Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220 (Me. 1980).
70 Buckeye Union, 17 Ohio App. 3d at 134, 477 N.E.2d at 1235.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 132, 477 N.E.2d at 1234.
73 An Oregon appellate court in Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or. App. 136, 711 P.2d 212 (1985)
(discharge of wastes into sewer lines) held the pollution exclusion clause was not ambiguous. Also, a
Pennsylvania court in Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 338 Pa. Super. 1,487 A.2d 820 (1984) (chemical
dumping) applied the exclusion clause as if unambiguous.
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took the first step toward a new analysis of the pollution exclusion clause issue. In
Waste Management of Carolinas v. Peerless Insurance Co., the state supreme court
reversed the appellate court and held there was no duty to defend claims arising from
the six year long intentional disposal of solid waste at a landfill. 74 The clause,
according the court, was not ambiguous; in fact, "it strains at logic" to perceive
ambiguity.7 The court criticized both New Jersey and New York for their semantic
gymnastics with the interpretation of "sudden and accidental." 76 Specifically, the
court found fault with decisions, such as Jackson Township that held gradual seepage
or pollution from a site could be sudden and accidental events 77 Waste Management
is an important case, aside from its strong reversal and criticism of a lower North
Carolina court, in that it represented a new voice on the insurer's side.78 While the
previously discussed trilogy of cases effectively removed the pollution exclusion
clause from the CGL policy, this case clearly reflects a step toward returning the
clause to the policy and reinstating it as a device purposely selected by insurance
companies to appropriately limit coverage for certain pollution events.
An equally significant decision was handed down by a district court applying
Pennsylvania law. The court in Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co. held the pollution exclusion clause unambiguous and granted summary judg-
ment for the insurance company.7 9 Company practices of disposing of TCE in floor
drains which leaked into groundwater were not sudden and accidental occurrences. 80
"Sudden," according to the court, signifies an event that occurs abruptly, without
warning." This decision was consistent with prior Pennsylvania law.
82
Ohio addressed the pollution exclusion clause again the following year in
Kipin Industries, Inc. v. American Universal Insurance Co. 8 3 Like Buckeye Union,
which had been decided three years earlier, this case also arose from the operation
of the waste disposal site in Hamilton, Ohio. The plaintiffs in this action were insured
seeking a declaratory judgment that their carrier, American Universal, had a duty to
defend them in suits filed by the State of Ohio and the United States. Cross-motions
74 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374, reh'g denied, 316 N.C. 386, 346 S.E.2d 134 (1986).
71 Id. at 695,340 S.E.2d at 379. "A common sense reading of [the clause] reveals that the exclusion narrows
a virtually limitless class of events termed 'occurrence' which can occur suddenly or over the course of time,
to non-polluting events or to polluting events that occur 'suddenly and accidentally."' Id.
76 Id. at 697-99, 340 S.E.2d at 381-82. "The gloss on the pollution exclusion has led more than one court
astray." Id. at 696 n.4, 340 S.E.2d at 380 n.4, referring to Jackson Township and Van's Westlake.
77 Id.
78 Thus, we will refer to subsequent consistent cases as following the North Carolina approach.
79 656 F. Supp. 132, 140 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
80 Id.
8! Id. Several cases, however, decided at the same time as Fischer & Porter still reached results reminiscent
of Klock Oil and Jonesville Products, Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 156 Mich. App. 508,402 N.W.2d 46
(1986) (continuous releases could be sudden so long as unintended); State v. INA Underwriters Ins. Co., 507
N.Y.S.2d 112 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (leakage of gasoline over five year period could be sudden). Fischer &
Porter is diametrically opposite to these cases and indicative of the split in authority that began to develop
in 1986.
82 See Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 335 Pa. Super. 1,487 A.2d 820.
83 41 Ohio App. 3d 228, 535 N.E.2d 334 (1987).
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for summary judgment were filed. The trial court held in favor of the plaintiffs.84 On
appeal, the appellate court affirmed, finding that American Universal did have a duty
to defend.85
American Universal's decision to decline coverage was based in part on the
pollution exclusion clause.86 The appellate court expressly followed Buckeye Union
as to its interpretation of the sudden and accidental exception to the exclusion.8 7 The
court concluded that an event is "sudden and accidental" and thus not excluded from
comprehensive coverage if the damaging result is neither expected nor intended by
the insured.8 8 The clause was strictly construed because of its ambiguity, according
to the court.8 9
The Sixth Circuit, applying Ohio law came to a contrary result. In Borden,
Inc. v. Affiliated F. M. Insurance Co.,9° the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio held that the pollution exclusion clause was not ambiguous
and awarded summary judgment to the defendant insurer in a declaratory judgment
action brought by the insured Borden, Inc.91 In 1982 Amoco sued Borden alleging
that Borden had fraudulently concealed the presence of hazardous waste on land it
sold to Amoco.92 The complaint also sought response costs under CERCLA.
93
Borden put its carrier, Affiliated F.M. Insurance Company ("Affiliated"), on
notice. 94 However, Affiliated refused to defend, citing lack of an occurrence and
the applicability of the pollution exclusion. 95 As a consequence, Borden sued
Affiliated seeking a declaratory judgment that Affiliated had the duty to defend and
indemnify it in the Amoco suit.96 The suit was heard in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction. 97
Borden based its arguments on the Ohio decision of Buckeye Union.98 The
4 Id. at 228, 535 N.E.2d at 335.
85 id. at 232, 535 N.E.2d at 339.
86 Id. at 229-30, 535 N.E.2d at 336. It was also based on the argument that the damages alleged did not
constitute an occurrence.
87 Id. at 231, 535 N.E.2d at 338.
88 Id.
89 Id. In accord is a New Jersey appellate court decision, Broadwell Realty Services, Inc. v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 218 N.J. Super. 516, 528 A.2d 76 (1987), reaffirming the New Jersey view and noting that
"sudden" means fortuitous. See also New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp.
1359 (D. Del. 1987) (split of authority regarding ambiguity of clause makes it ambiguous).
90 682 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Ohio 1987), affd, 865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 68 (1989).
91 Id. at 931.
92 Id. at 928.
93 Id.
94 Id.
91 Id. Affiliated also declined to defend on the basis of a nuclear exclusion in the policy.
96 Id.
97 The federal court applied Ohio law. A federal court in diversity must apply the law of the state in which
it sits. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
98 Borden, 682 F. Supp. at 929.
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court noted that cases from other jurisdictions also supported this position.99 The
court admitted that Buckeye is entitled to some deference as the precedent from the
state appellate court, but pointed out it was not bound by that decision. °0 The court
determined that the Ohio Supreme Court would not adopt the construction of the
pollution exclusion that was set forth in Buckeye. °'0 According to the court, the
clause was not ambiguous. 02 "Sudden" meant happening without previous notice
or on brief notice. 10 3 "Accidental" meant occurring sometimes with unfortunate
results by chance."° The meanings of these terms, according to the court, were clear
and the terms "should not be twisted simply to provide coverage when courts deem
it desirable." 10 5
The Amoco complaint against Borden alleged that Borden regularly deposited
radioactive wastes on its property as a part of its production of phosphoric acid.'0 6
(It was admitted that this occurred at least from 1964 through 1970). The allegation,
according to the court, was not one of a "sudden and accidental" event. 0 7 "Rather,
[the event was].. . precisely the type of activity which the pollution exclusion was
drafted to preclude."' 1 8 Thus, Affiliated owed no duty to defend or indemnify
Borden.109
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed, stating
that it found no error.1° Borden has since petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for review. This however was denied."1'
99 The court cited and briefly discussed Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156,451 A.2d 990; Niagara County v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 103 Misc. 2d
814,427 N.Y.S.2d 171; and United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708,664
P.2d 1262.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 930.
103 Id.
104 Id.
"0 The court cited with approval the decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Waste Management
of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374. Other decisions decided contempo-
raneously were in accord, holding that the clause excluded coverage for the release of waste on a regular basis
or as a part of normal business. Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 335 Pa. Super. 1, 487 A.2d 820; Fischer
& PorterCo. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. 656F.Supp. 132; Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union
Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (New Hampshire law) (discharge of pollutants from a barrel
reconditioning plant); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or. App. 136, 711 P.2d 212.
06 Borden, 682 F. Supp. at 928.
,07 Id. at 930.
108 Id.
1o9 Id.
110 Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated F.M. Ins. Co., 865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir. 1989). In accord with this view are
Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 677 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (reaffirmed the
Pennsylvania view; continuous activity cannot be sudden: dumping of industrial wastes), American
Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1987) (although accidental is a
subjective term, sudden is objective meaning either instantaneous or on brief notice and unexpected), and
State v. Mauthe, 412 Wis. 2d 620,419 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (long term pollution not sudden and
accidental).
... Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated F.M. Ins. Co., 110 S. Ct. 68 (1989).
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Borden, we believe, foreshadows a necessary change in Ohio law. Buckeye
and Kipin both relied extensively on the aforementioned trilogy of earlier cases.
While this may have been appropriate action in 1984 and 1987, continued adherence
to these decisions is unwarranted. Time has passed and new, and in our view more
logical, decisions have been rendered. The Sixth Circuit in Borden recognized the
development of the law through 1987. In 1988, we witnessed further development
as several jurisdictions switched approaches. Significantly, the courts adopted the
North Carolina approach.
1988: The Transitionary Period
One such court was the Illinois appellate court in International Minerals &
Chemical Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance.'12 The court recognized the split in
authority regarding the pollution exclusion clause, 113 and then, disregarding Illinois
precedent, held the clause unambiguous. The court proceeded cautiously, embark-
ing on a "word-by-word analysis" of the clause." 4 It concluded "accidental"
referred to an unintended and unexpected discharge of pollutants and that "sudden"
had a temporal significance."'5 Summary judgment was affirmed for the insurers.
The most important transition case, however, was Diamond Shamrock Chemi-
cal Co. v. Aetna 16 in which a New Jersey Superior Court sharply criticized the prior
New Jersey cases."17 The court, although acknowledging it was bound by New
Jersey appellate court decisions, insisted that sudden have a temporal element. Any
other definition of the term would be "an intellectually unacceptable distortion of
the fair meaning of the word." " 8 The trial judge succeeded in evading the precedent
by narrowing his decision to hinge on the peculiar knowledge or expectation by the
insured of the pollution in this case.
A split still existed among the states regarding interpretation of the pollution
exclusion clause. In fact, another New Jersey appellate court cited with approval
Jackson Township and Broadwell Realty, holding that insurance coverage was only
excluded by the clause where the damages were expected or intended by the in-
112 168 I11. App. 3d 361, 522 N.E.2d 758 (1988) (discharge of wastes at barrel reconditioning facility).
"3 "The singular point of agreement in this case seems to be that the two lines of cases supporting the parties'
respective positions are irreconcilable." Id. at 374, 522 N.E.2d at 766.
114 Id. at 376, 522 N.E.2d at 767.
'1 Id. at 376-77, 522 N.E.2d at 768.
116 No. C-3939-84 (N.J. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 1989).
"17 "Unfortunately, a number of reported decisions... have, in my opinion, flatly misread the plain language
of the pollution exclusion and have fundamentally misunderstood the way in which the exclusion and its
exception are designed to function." Id. The court took specific issue with the New Jersey case of Broadwell:
"Broadwell was decided by the appellate division which is our intermediate appellate court. Reported
decisions of the appellate decision are binding upon me as a trial judge. If I think that the appellate division
made a mistake in deciding Broadwell (as I do), then I can (as I have) point out the mistake in the hope that
it will hereafter be corrected by the appellate division or by the supreme court."
118 Id.
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sured. 119 Also, a Washington superior court in Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.120 issued an opinion which limited the applicability of the
exclusion to active polluters. That is, the exclusion clause would only preclude
coverage if the pollution were caused by active polluters.1"1
The majority of cases decided in 1988, however, followed the North Carolina
approach. Receiving the most attention by the courts was the term "sudden" which
earlier courts, following the New Jersey lead, had concluded simply meant unex-
pected. These courts held that "sudden" must have some temporal significance and
that long-term exposure or pollution could not constitute "sudden and accidental"
pollution.1 22 Additionally, several courts concluded that the pollution exclusion
clause was not ambiguous.'23
1989: The Recent Cases
The strongest recent decision was handed down by a Pennsylvania Superior
Court in Lower Paxon Township v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. in which
the court held no coverage arose from the emission of methane gas from a landfill. 124
The court noted that numerous decisions regarding the pollution exclusion clause
had been rendered in the past decade.1 25 Pennsylvania precedent also supported the
view that the pollution exclusion clause is not ambiguous. 12 6 The facts of Lower
Paxon may be the most appropriate to illustrate the pollution event to which the
119 Summit Assoc., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 229 N.J. Super. 56, 550 A.2d 1235 (1988) (sludge
pit).
120 No. 86-2-06236-0 (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 1988) (disposal of industrial wastes into pits).
121 Id.
122 Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., No. C-87-2306 (D. Utah 1988). (sudden means
instantaneous and abrupt); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 693 F. Supp. 617
(M.D. Tenn. 1988), affd 875 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1989) (court denied coverage for hazardous waste disposal
which took place over a period of six years. The release of pollutants must occur quickly in time); Shell Oil
Co. v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co., No. 278953 (Ca. Super. Ct. 1988); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.
v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988).
123 Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna, No. C-87-2306 (D. Utah 1988); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Korman
Corp., 693 F. Supp. 253 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (the event must be both sudden and accidental. No coverage was
allowed for pollution from a landfill which occurred over a 30 year period); Powers Chemco Inc. v. Federal
Ins. Co., 144 A.D.2d 445, 533 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1988), aff d, 74 N.Y.2d 910 (1989) (pollution exclusion clause
clear and unambiguous); Technicon Elec. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 141 A.D.2d 124, 533
N.Y.S.2d 91 (1988) (the emerging nationwide judicial consensus was that the clause was unambiguous);
Hayes v. Maryland Casualty Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513 (N.D. Fla. 1988).
124 383 Pa. Super. 558, 557 A.2d 393 (1989).
125 "An ever-increasing number of courts have rejected the insured's ambiguity argument and have found
that sudden and accidental has a clear plain meaning that excludes coverage not only for intentional pollution
but also for any unintentional release or dispersal of pollution that occurs gradually over time." Id. at 569,
557 A.2d at 398. The court also cited the recent cases of United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals,
Inc., 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988) and United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. The Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 693
F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). Further, the court quoted Technicon, "there is an emerging nationwide
judicial consensus that the 'pollution exclusion' clause is unambiguous." Lower Paxon, 141 A.D.2d at 569,
557 A.2d at 398.
126 Lower Paxon, 141 A.D.2d at 569, 557 A.2d at 398 (citing Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 335 Pa.
Super. 1, 487 A.2d 820).
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pollution exclusion clause was intended to apply. The pollution was the emission of
methane gas from a landfill. This gas is produced and emanates from buried waste
material only gradually leaching into the surrounding soil and atmosphere.
127
Gradual polluting events are precisely those to which the exclusion clause was to
apply. Any reading of the "sudden and accidental" exception to the exclusion to
allow coverage in such a situation would clearly contravene the purpose and clear
meaning of the clause.
Several courts concurred with Lower Paxon's reasoning that the pollution
exclusion clause was not ambiguous. In C. L. Hauthaway & Sons Corp. v. Ameri-
can Motorists Insurance Co.,121 the district court for the district of Massachusetts de-
clined to follow an earlier Massachusetts appellate court case 129 and held the
pollution exclusion clause unambiguous. 130 Agreeing that "sudden" connotes
unanticipated and unforeseen, the court nonetheless disagreed that such definition
was exclusive.' 3 ' "Sudden" must refer to more than the individual's subjective state
of mind to differentiate it from "accident.' 1 32 Thus, it must have some temporal
significance.
133
In the Sixth Circuit, the Court of Appeals in United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. The Murray Ohio Manufacturing Co. affirmed the district court decision
finding the pollution exclusion clause unambiguous. 134 Consequently, the court
applied the literal meaning of the pollution exclusion clause to claims arising from
a chemical the historical background of the exclusionary clause mandated that the
ambiguities within the clause be construed against the insurance company. The court
found coverage for claims arising from the disposal of hazardous waste.135
Two VIEWS
To summarize, two approaches have been developed by the courts. One
approach, the New Jersey approach, holds that the pollution exclusion clause is
ambiguous in nature and must be construed strictly against the insurer. Once the
127 Id. at 578, 557 A.2d at 403.
128 712 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1989).
129 Shapiro v. Public Serv. Mutual Ins. Co., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 648,477 N.E.2d 146 (1985) (finding the clause
ambiguous, the court held that coverage existed for damages from oil leakage from an underground fuel tank).
"' This decision is analagous to the Sixth Circuit decision in Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated F.M. Ins. Co., 865
F.2d 1267, in which the federal court opined that the Ohio Supreme Court would not follow the Ohio
intermediate appellate courts. Like Ohio, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had not, and has not,
ruled on the issue of the pollution exclusion clause.
"i' Hauthaway, 712 F. Supp. at 267-68.
3 Id. at 268.
I33 d. But see to the contrary, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Quinn Constr. Co., 713 F. Supp. 35 (D. Mass. 1989) where
the court followed Shapiro. Gasoline contamination from an underground tank could be sudden and
accidental, according to the Quinn court. See also C.K. Smith & Co. v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins.
Co., No. 85-32950 (Super. Ct. Mass. 1988) (trial court following Shapiro).
134 875 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying Tennessee law), affirming 693 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Tenn. 1988).
131 United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coating, 180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 535 N.E.2d 1071 (1989).
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decision is made that the clause is ambiguous then it is rare, if at all, that the excep-
tion to the exclusion does not come into play. That is, coverage will be found.
The other approach, the North Carolina approach, holds that the pollution
exclusion clause is not ambiguous. If it is found to be unambiguous, then the terms
"sudden" and "accidental" must be defined. Sudden is defined, by these courts,
to have some temporal meaning. Thus, any discharge of pollution occurring
gradually or over a period of time would not be covered. The discharge must also
be accidental. This is held to mean unexpected or unintended. Again, the focus is
on the discharge and not the damage. The fact that the insured may not have expected
the resulting damage is irrelevant if the insured expected or intended the discharge.
IMPLICATIONS FOR OHIO
Only two Ohio courts have addressed the issue of the pollution exclusion
clause - Buckeye Union and Kipin. At the time the Court of Appeals for Summit
County decided Buckeye Union, the New Jersey interpretation of the clause was the
established approach. The definitions of "sudden" and "accidental" set forth in
Lansco and Jackson Township were recognized in Alabama, Maine, New York, and
Washington. Klock Oil added support with its removal of the temporal significance
from "sudden." And the Buckeye Union court followed in step with the case law
as it had evolved to that point. Acknowledging construction of the pollution
exclusion clause to be a question of first impression in Ohio, the court relied greatly
on the decisions of other jurisdictions, quoting in each paragraph of its discussion of
the clause.
In turn, the decision of the court of Appeals for Hamilton County relied greatly
on Buckeye Union. The Kipin court's interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause
encompasses but one paragraph in which it quotes Buckeye Union. No reconsidera-
tion of the issue or independent interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause is
evident from the face of the opinion. Whereas the Buckeye Union court turned to the
decisions of other jurisdictions for instruction, the Kipin court confined itself to
Buckeye Union. It is certainly understandable for one appellate court to look to a
sister court for interpretative assistance. Nonetheless, it would be quite different for
a court today to rely on a 1984 or 1987 decision given the developments in this area
of the law.
In Borden, however, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio, applying Ohio law, did discuss pertinent decisions from other jurisdictions.
Rejecting Buckeye Union as non-persuasive of the future direction of the Ohio Su-
preme Court, the Borden court relied upon North Carolina, Pennsylvania and
Indiana case law. 136 While it cannot be imagined that judicial opinions memorialize
136 Among others, the court considered Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C.
688, 340 S.E.2d 374; Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 335 Pa. Super. 1,487 A.2d 820; Fischer & Porter
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the thought processes of the judge or judicial panel, they evidence the sources
considered in rendering the decision.
The Ohio case law, as developed by our state courts, is based solely upon the
status of the law in 1984 when Buckeye Union was decided and based primarily upon
the early New Jersey cases. Certainly, the law has evolved and changed since Lansco
in 1974 and even since Buckeye Union itself in 1984. The issues have become clearer
and the increased judicial scrutiny of these issues has produced a new and prevailing
approach to the interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause. The days of knee-
jerk decisions labeling the clause ambiguous are past. The clause, in the eyes of
today's courts, now stands on footing equal to the other provisions within the CGL.
It is unambiguous as written and, the language must be accorded a literal, and rea-
sonable, interpretation. There is no need to construe the clause against the insurer
or to perform semantic gymnastics to remove any temporal sense from "sudden."
The discussion in the cases has now moved from the definitions of "sudden" and
'accidental" to, properly, the factual situation within the cases. Whether insurance
coverage exists for pollution now rests, as it should, upon the cold factual record.
It is against this contemporary setting that Ohio courts today will interpret the
pollution exclusion clause in years to come. We will not speculate as to the outcome
in any insurance coverage dispute since such a resolution will be entirely dependent
upon the particular facts of the case.
CONCLUSIONS
The unique area of law surrounding insurance coverage for environmental
matters is in a state of flux. At the same time, the stakes for all involved are grow-
ing. The number of hazardous waste sites discovered is increasing, and remediation
costs are rising. Insured assert every viable argument available to them to secure
insurance coverage for their costs. Insurance companies, on the other hand, assert
that their policies were carefully written to cover some risks but not others. The
pollution exclusion clause is a prime example.
Many courts have been called upon to resolve disputes involving this clause.
In this rapidly evolving area of the law, the Ohio decisions on point have simply
become dated. While arguments could have been made at the time the Ohio
decisions were handed down to support the holdings, such arguments are no longer
tenable. The issue of the pollution exclusion clause has now been refined by the
courts. The correct interpretation has become apparent. This cannot be ignored by
the Ohio courts.
Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 656 F. Supp. 132; and Barmet of Indiana, Inc. v. Security Ins. Group., 425
N.E.2d 201 (Ind. 1981).
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